

Message Text

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

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ARA/ECA:RWZIMMERMAN
S/S:SESTEINER

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R 150054Z JAN 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES

S E C R E T STATE 009599

EXDIS

FOL RPT LIMA 0307 ACTION SECSTATE INFO BOGOTA BRASILIA
CARACAS LA PAZ QUITO SANTIAGO 12 JAN QUOTE

S E C R E T LIMA 0307

EXDIS

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SHLAUDEMAN FROM DEAN

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PE, CI, EC, BL, CO, VE

SUBJECT/ PERU-CHILE-ECUDADOR-BOLIVIA

REF: 76 STATE 314123, 76 CARACAS 14758, 76 SANTIAGO 12205

BRASILIA 0023, LA PAZ 0087, QUITO 01303,

LIMA 0248, LIMA 11579, LIMA A-002

1. WE HAVE POUCHED THIS WEEK AN AIRGRAM (A-002) ANALYZING SOURCES
OF TENSION AND "WAR SCARE" IN THE ANDEAN REGION. I RECOMMEND

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THAT THE DEPARTMENT DISTRIBUTE COPIES TO INTERESTED POSTS.
WITH THE ANALYSIS POUCHED WE NOW WISH TO COMMENT ON SOME OF THE
QUESTIONS RAISED IN REFTELS.

2. THE RECENT "WAR SCARE IN THE ANDES" HAS SERVED A USE-
FUL PURPOSE BY ENCOURAGING THE PARTIES IMMEDIATELY CONCERNED
TO MAKE PROFESSIONS OF PEACE AND TO TAKE ACTIONS

WHICH HAVE IN FACT REDUCED TENSIONS AND BOUGHT TIME.
THE PROBLEM REPORTEDLY HAS BECOME A MATTER OF CONCERN TO PRESIDENTS
LOPEX MICHELSEN AND PEREZ, AND SEVERAL AMBASSADORS HAVE
SET FORTH CONSIDERATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS THAT SHOULD
HELP OUR THINKING ALONG.

3. THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION IN THIS REGION
ARE:

- HISTORICAL, INCLUDING TRADITIONAL PERU/CHILE
RIVALRY AND PERUVIAN IRREDENTISM, ECUADOREAN IRREDENTISM
AGAINST PERU, AND BOLIVIA'S HOPE FOR RECOVERED ACCESS TO
THE SEA WITHOUT TERRITORIAL EXCHANGE;
- MILITARY, INCLUDING PERU'S CONTINUING EXCESSIVE
ARMS ACQUISITIONS, FUELED IN PART BY ITS FEAR OF CHILEAN
FIGHTING CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS, AND CREATING A
SERIOUS ARMS IMBALANCE; AND
- POLITICAL, INCLUDING COMPARATIVELY LEFTIST PERU'S
PERCEPTION OF RIGHTIST POTENTIAL ENEMIES ON EVERY LAND
BORDER, AND THE USSR'S LONG-TERM AND CUBA'S SHORT-TERM
OR EVEN IMMEDIATE INTEREST IN INCREASING THEIR INFLUENCE
HERE.

4. THESE SOURCES OF TENSIONS ARE COMPLEX AND NUMEROUS.
THEY DO NOT LEND THEMSELVES TO RAPID AND SIMULTANEOUS
ELIMINATION. THE OAS MIGHT TAKE A HAND AT IT, BUT THE
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IS CUMBERSOME AND EARLY OAS
INVOLVEMENT IN EITHER THE CORRIDOR QUESTION OR THE
SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL PROBLEM MIGHT BE REJECTED BY
SOME OR ALL OF THE PARTIES. IN MY OPINION THERE IS

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LITTLE THE OAS CAN DO ON THE CORRIDOR QUESTION. THE
PARTIES THEMSELVES MUST CONTINUE THEIR EFFORT TO WORK
IT OUT, IF IT IS TO BE WORKED OUT AT ALL. THERE ARE
SIGNS THAT THEY WILL AT LEAST TRY. WE NOTE THAT CHILE
AND PERU HAVE ESTABLISHED A "MIXED COMMISSION" TO
STRENGTHEN ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS,
AND CHILEAN AMBASSADOR BULNES HAS TOLD ME THAT THIS COM-
MISSION'S MANDATE WILL PERMIT IT TO DEAL WITH POLITICAL
PROBLEMS AS WELL. THIS IS A HOPEFUL SIGN OF BILATERAL
EFFORTS WHICH MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED BY VENEZUELA AND
COLOMBIA (THEY HAVE SOME EXPERIENCE IN TENSION-REDUCING
MIXED COMMISSIONS). THE OAS SHOULD, HOWEVER, USEFULLY
FOCUS ON ANDEAN REGION DISARMAMENT INITIATIVES AND THE
1974 "SPIRIT OF AYACUCHO" AT THE SAME TIME REFERRING TO
DISQUIETING REPORTS (NOW WIDELY AIRED IN PUBLIC) ON AREA
TENSIONS. OAS INTEREST IN THIS MATTER COULD
IN ITSELF BE A FURTHER MODERATING INFLUENCE. LATER, SHOULD
A CRISIS DEVELOP, IT MIGHT LEAD TO A "PEACE MAKER EFFORT"
BY THE OAS SECRETARY GENERAL (LA PAZ 0087) AS WELL AS

TO AN OAS "FACT FINDING" MISSION.

5. I AM ATTRACTED, HOWEVER, TO AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS BASIC IDEA OF PEACE INITIATIVE BY "THIRD PARTY" STATES AS A FIRST STEP. THESE STATES MIGHT USEFULLY OFFER THEIR GOOD OFFICES REGARDING THE CORRIDOR QUESTION IN ADDITION TO EXPRESSING THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT OVERALL TENSIONS IN THE AREA. DIRECT U.S. INVOLVEMENT AS ONE OF THE "THIRD PARTY" STATES COULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND IN MY OPINION SHOULD BE AVOIDED AT THIS STAGE, BUT VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA AND ARGENTINA MIGHT BE ENCOURAGED TO ATTEMPT TO TAKE A LEAD. VENEZUELA MIGHT WELL DIRECT EFFORTS. IF IT WERE RELUCTANT, OR IF AMBASSADOR VAKY COUNSELS OTHERWISE, COLOMBIA OR ARGENTINA MIGHT STEP IN. A FONMIN OFFICIAL RECENTLY TOLD AN EMBOFF THAT THE PERUVIAN EMBASSY IN BUENOS AIRES REPORTS A POSSIBLE ARGENTINE OFFER TO HOST BOLIVIA/CHILE/PERU DIS-
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CUSSIONS ON THE CORRIDOR. THE SOURCE CLAIMED THAT ARGENTINA COULD INFLUENCE CHILE WHILE VENEZUELA COULD NOT, AND HE FELT GOP RESPONSE TO AN ARGENTINA PROPOSAL MIGHT WELL BE POSITIVE. WE SHOULD NOT ENCOURAGE BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION, BUT OF COURSE SHOULD NOT ARGUE AGAINST SUCH PARTICIPATION SHOULD BRAZIL OFFER SERVICES. FINALLY, THE U.S. COULD IN DUE COURSE OFFER ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE NEGOTIATING STATES THROUGH THE PROMISE OF ECONOMIC AID AND PERHAPS SOME INVESTMENT IN A RESTRUCTURED PERU/ BOLIVIA/CHILE BORDER REGION ONCE A POLITICAL AGREEMENT IS REACHED.

6. REGARDING ARMS LIMITATION EFFORTS, THE "THIRD PARTY"

STATES COULD APPROACH PERU, CHILE, ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA IN ORDER TO HELP THE PARTIES FIND AN ACCEPTABLE FORMULA FOR ARMAMENTS CEILINGS. THEY MIGHT EVEN OFFER TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH NEW AGREED ARMS LEVELS, ALTHOUGH THAT SENSITIVE TASK MIGHT BE MORE APPROPRIATE FOR THE OAS MACHINERY. BOLIVIA WOULD PRESUMABLY WELCOME SUCH PROPOSALS. CHILE AND ECUADOR MIGHT WELL AGREE TO THEM IF THEIR CURRENT FEAR OF PERU'S ARMAMENTS ARE AS GREAT AS THEY PROFESS. PERU MIGHT BE EMBARRASSED TO REFUSE SUCH AN APPROACH AND VENEZUELA COULD EVEN MAKE CERTAIN ECONOMIC SUPPORT CONTINGENT ON A GOP COMMITMENT TO REDUCE ARMS EXPENDITURES.

7. IT WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND CONTRIBUTE TO AN "ENCIRCLEMENT" MENTALITY WERE PERU ALONE TO BE APPROACHED ON ARMS LIMITATION. THE U.S. SHOULD AVOID SINGLING OUT PERU FOR ANY DEMARCHE. MOREOVER, I DO NOT BELIEVE THE U.S. SHOULD

MAKE ANY APPROACH TO THE GOP IN WASHINGTON OR IN LIMA WHICH WOULD TEND TO MAKE THE AUTONOMY OF THE "THIRD PARTY" STATES SUSPECT.

8. THE U.S. MAY FIND IT NECESSARY TO WARN CUBA NOT TO MEDDLE,
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AND MAKE CLEAR THAT THERE WILL BE NO IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IF WE DO DETECT CHBAN EFFORTS TO COMPLICATE OR DEFEAT THE INITIATIVES OF THE THIRD PARTIES. THE U.S. SHOULD QUIETLY GO ON RECORD WITH THE CONCERNED PARTIES THAT THE USG WOULD NOT TOLERATE CUBAN MILITARY INTERVENTION.

9. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO PRESSURE PERU TO ACCEPT THE THIRD PARTIES, INTIATIVE, CERTAINLY NOT (AS MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATED) BY THREATENING TO END OUR OWN MILITARY COOPERATION OR MAAG PRESENCE HERE. WE CAN HOPE THAT THE THIRD PARTIES WILL BE WILLING TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE OF THE KIND OUTLINED ABOVE THAT WILL BE SUCCESSFUL AT LEAST IN KEEPING THE CONTENDING STATES TALKING. IF, HOWEVER, NOTHING COMES OF THIS, WE WILL NEED BILATERAL CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION ALL THE MORE. OUR MILITARY PROGRAMS AND PERSONNEL--EVEN IF TRIMMED IN SIZE--ARE IMPORTANT TO US, ESPECIALLY WITH THIS MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THEY ARE NOT OF A SIZE TO CONTRIBUTE IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY TO A REGIONAL ARMS RACE AND, IF FACT, THEIR EXISTENCE IN THE PAST MAY WELL HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SOME RESTRAINT AND REGIONAL BALANCE. WE CERTAINLY DO NOT WANT TO PUSH THE PERUVIANS INTO THE ARMS OF THE RUSSIAN BEAR. AN AN EVENTUALITY THAT CAUSES MOST OF THEM AS MUCH CONCERN AS IT DOES US.

10. MANY APPARENTLY UNRELATED POLICIES AND PROGRAMS CAN IMPACT UPON POLITICAL AND MILITARY TENSIONS IN THE AREA. IN ADDITION TO U.S. ARMS POLICY, OUR ECONOMIC AID PROGRAMS, OVERALL POLITICAL POSTURE, AND EVEN HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY WILL BE RELEVANT. I THINK THAT REGIONAL MILITARY BALANCE AND CONFLICT POTENTIAL WILL HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOINT IN CONNECTION WITH OUR HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES, AID EFFORTS AND OTHER PROGRAMS IN ALL CONCERNED COUNTRIES.

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11. THE DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO SHARE THIS

MESSAGE WITH AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES ALSO.

DEAN

UNQUOTE KISSINGER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
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Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 15-Jan-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
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Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
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